Executive Summary
Raze.bot is a multi-wallet Solana trading platform that prioritizes user security through local transaction processing and client-side private key management. This audit documentation demonstrates that Raze.bot implements industry-standard security practices to ensure that private keys never leave the userβs device and all sensitive operations are performed locally.π Core Security Principles
1. Local Private Key Management
Private keys are generated, stored, and used exclusively on the client-side:| Aspect | Implementation |
|---|---|
| Key Generation | New wallets are created using Solanaβs Keypair.generate() method locally in the browser |
| Key Storage | Private keys are encrypted using AES encryption before storage |
| Key Usage | Transaction signing occurs entirely in the browser using local keypairs |
| Zero Server Transmission | Private keys are never sent to any server or external service |
2. Client-Side Transaction Signing
All transaction signing happens locally in the userβs browser:3. Encrypted Local Storage
Wallet data is encrypted before storage:| Feature | Details |
|---|---|
| Encryption Method | AES encryption using CryptoJS |
| Storage Locations | IndexedDB (primary) and localStorage (backup) |
| Key Protection | Encryption key is hardcoded in client code (standard for client-side apps) |
| Migration Support | Automatic migration from unencrypted to encrypted storage |
π‘οΈ Security Architecture
Transaction Flow Security
1
Unsigned Transaction Request
- Client requests unsigned transaction from server
- Server returns transaction template without signatures
- No private keys involved in this step
2
Local Transaction Signing
- Client deserializes unsigned transaction
- Private key is used locally to sign transaction
- Signed transaction is serialized for transmission
3
Signed Transaction Submission
- Only the signed transaction is sent to server
- Server forwards to Jito Bundle Service or RPC
- Private keys remain on client device
Wallet Management Security
Wallet Creation
Wallet Import
Data Encryption Implementation
π Security Audit Findings
β Strengths
Local Key Management
Local Key Management
- Private keys are generated using secure Solana libraries
- Keys never leave the client environment
- All cryptographic operations performed locally
Transaction Security
Transaction Security
- Transactions are signed client-side using local keypairs
- Only signed transactions are transmitted to servers
- No private key exposure during transaction processing
Data Protection
Data Protection
- Wallet data encrypted using AES before storage
- Multiple storage backends (IndexedDB + localStorage)
- Automatic migration from unencrypted to encrypted storage
Code Transparency
Code Transparency
- Open-source codebase allows for public security review
- Clear separation between client and server responsibilities
- Well-documented security practices
β οΈ Considerations
π οΈ Security Dependencies
Core Security Libraries
| Library | Purpose |
|---|---|
| @solana/web3.js | Official Solana library for blockchain interactions |
| bs58 | Base58 encoding/decoding for Solana addresses and keys |
| crypto-js | AES encryption for local data protection |
| js-cookie | Secure cookie management |
Security-Relevant Dependencies
π Best Practices Implemented
1. Principle of Least Privilege
- Server only receives unsigned transaction templates and signed transactions
- No unnecessary data transmission
- Minimal server-side private data handling
2. Defense in Depth
- Multiple storage mechanisms (IndexedDB + localStorage)
- Encryption at rest
- Client-side validation and error handling
3. Secure Development Practices
- TypeScript for type safety
- Comprehensive error handling
- Input validation for private keys and transactions
π Security Checklist
Private keys generated locally using secure libraries
Private keys never transmitted to servers
All transaction signing performed client-side
Wallet data encrypted before storage
Multiple storage backends for redundancy
Open-source code for transparency
Secure dependency management
Proper error handling and validation
Clear separation of client/server responsibilities
π Competitor Security Analysis
Overview
To provide context for Raze.botβs security approach, we analyzed how major Solana trading bot competitors handle private keys and transaction security. This comparison highlights the varying approaches to user security in the trading bot ecosystem.Security Trade-offs Analysis
| Feature | Raze.bot | BullX | GMGN | Photon | Axiom | Padre (Terminal) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Local Key Storage | β | β | β | β | β | β |
| Client-Side Signing | β | β | β | β | β | β |
| Zero Server Transmission | β | β | β | β | β | β |
| Open Source Security | β | β | β | β | β | β |
β
= Implemented, β = Not implemented, β = Unclear/Unverified
π― Conclusion
Raze.bot implements a security-first architecture that ensures:Private keys remain local
Never transmitted or stored on servers
Local transaction signing
All cryptographic operations performed in the browser
Encrypted storage
Wallet data protected at rest
Transparent security
Open-source code allows for public audit
Users can confidently use Raze.bot knowing that their private keys and sensitive data remain under their complete control on their local device.
π Security Contact
For security-related questions or to report vulnerabilities:This security audit documentation demonstrates Raze.botβs commitment to user security and transparency. The platformβs architecture ensures that users maintain complete control over their private keys while providing a seamless trading experience.
