Audit
Raze.bot Security Audit Documentation
Executive Summary
Raze.bot is a multi-wallet Solana trading platform that prioritizes user security through local transaction processing and client-side private key management. This audit documentation demonstrates that Raze.bot implements industry-standard security practices to ensure that private keys never leave the user's device and all sensitive operations are performed locally.
🔐 Core Security Principles
1. Local Private Key Management
Private keys are generated, stored, and used exclusively on the client-side:
Key Generation: New wallets are created using Solana's
Keypair.generate()method locally in the browserKey Storage: Private keys are encrypted using AES encryption before storage
Key Usage: Transaction signing occurs entirely in the browser using local keypairs
Zero Server Transmission: Private keys are never sent to any server or external service
2. Client-Side Transaction Signing
All transaction signing happens locally in the user's browser:
// Transaction signing is performed locally
const signTransaction = (transactionBase58: string, privateKey: string): string => {
// Create keypair from private key (locally)
const keypair = web3.Keypair.fromSecretKey(bs58.decode(privateKey));
// Deserialize transaction
const txBuffer = bs58.decode(transactionBase58);
const transaction = web3.VersionedTransaction.deserialize(txBuffer);
// Sign the transaction locally
transaction.sign([keypair]);
// Return signed transaction
return bs58.encode(transaction.serialize());
};3. Encrypted Local Storage
Wallet data is encrypted before storage:
Encryption Method: AES encryption using CryptoJS
Storage Locations: IndexedDB (primary) and localStorage (backup)
Key Protection: Encryption key is hardcoded in client code (standard for client-side apps)
Migration Support: Automatic migration from unencrypted to encrypted storage
🛡️ Security Architecture
Transaction Flow Security
Unsigned Transaction Request
Client requests unsigned transaction from server
Server returns transaction template without signatures
No private keys involved in this step
Local Transaction Signing
Client deserializes unsigned transaction
Private key is used locally to sign transaction
Signed transaction is serialized for transmission
Signed Transaction Submission
Only the signed transaction is sent to server
Server forwards to Jito Bundle Service or RPC
Private keys remain on client device
Wallet Management Security
Wallet Creation
export const createNewWallet = async (): Promise<WalletType> => {
const keypair = Keypair.generate(); // Local generation
const address = keypair.publicKey.toString();
const privateKey = bs58.encode(keypair.secretKey);
return {
id: Date.now(),
address,
privateKey, // Stored locally only
isActive: false
};
};Wallet Import
export const importWallet = async (
privateKeyString: string
): Promise<{ wallet: WalletType | null; error?: string }> => {
// Validation and keypair creation happens locally
const privateKeyBytes = bs58.decode(privateKeyString);
const keypair = Keypair.fromSecretKey(privateKeyBytes);
const address = keypair.publicKey.toString();
// Private key remains in local memory only
return { wallet: { id: Date.now(), address, privateKey: privateKeyString, isActive: false } };
};Data Encryption Implementation
// Encryption utilities
const encryptData = (data: string): string => {
return CryptoJS.AES.encrypt(data, ENCRYPTION_KEY).toString();
};
const decryptData = (encryptedData: string): string => {
const bytes = CryptoJS.AES.decrypt(encryptedData, ENCRYPTION_KEY);
return bytes.toString(CryptoJS.enc.Utf8);
};
// Secure wallet storage
export const saveWalletsToCookies = (wallets: WalletType[]): void => {
const walletData = JSON.stringify(wallets);
const encryptedData = encryptData(walletData); // Encrypt before storage
localStorage.setItem(ENCRYPTED_STORAGE_KEY, encryptedData);
};🔍 Security Audit Findings
✅ Strengths
Local Key Management
Private keys are generated using secure Solana libraries
Keys never leave the client environment
All cryptographic operations performed locally
Transaction Security
Transactions are signed client-side using local keypairs
Only signed transactions are transmitted to servers
No private key exposure during transaction processing
Data Protection
Wallet data encrypted using AES before storage
Multiple storage backends (IndexedDB + localStorage)
Automatic migration from unencrypted to encrypted storage
Code Transparency
Open-source codebase allows for public security review
Clear separation between client and server responsibilities
Well-documented security practices
⚠️ Considerations
Client-Side Encryption Key
Encryption key is embedded in client code (standard limitation for client-side apps)
Users should be aware that client-side encryption protects against casual access, not determined attackers with code access
Browser Security Dependency
Security relies on browser's built-in protections
Users should use updated browsers and avoid compromised devices
Phishing Protection
Users must verify they're using the official Raze.bot domain
No additional phishing protection mechanisms implemented
🛠️ Security Dependencies
Core Security Libraries
@solana/web3.js: Official Solana library for blockchain interactions
bs58: Base58 encoding/decoding for Solana addresses and keys
crypto-js: AES encryption for local data protection
js-cookie: Secure cookie management
Security-Relevant Dependencies
{
"@solana/web3.js": "^1.95.8",
"bs58": "^6.0.0",
"crypto-js": "^4.2.0",
"js-cookie": "^3.0.5"
}🔒 Best Practices Implemented
1. Principle of Least Privilege
Server only receives unsigned transaction templates and signed transactions
No unnecessary data transmission
Minimal server-side private data handling
2. Defense in Depth
Multiple storage mechanisms (IndexedDB + localStorage)
Encryption at rest
Client-side validation and error handling
3. Secure Development Practices
TypeScript for type safety
Comprehensive error handling
Input validation for private keys and transactions
📋 Security Checklist
✅ Private keys generated locally using secure libraries
✅ Private keys never transmitted to servers
✅ All transaction signing performed client-side
✅ Wallet data encrypted before storage
✅ Multiple storage backends for redundancy
✅ Open-source code for transparency
✅ Secure dependency management
✅ Proper error handling and validation
✅ Clear separation of client/server responsibilities
🔍 Competitor Security Analysis
Overview
To provide context for Raze.bot's security approach, we analyzed how major Solana trading bot competitors handle private keys and transaction security. This comparison highlights the varying approaches to user security in the trading bot ecosystem.
Security Trade-offs Analysis
Local Key Storage
✅
❌
❌
❓
❌
❌
Client-Side Signing
✅
❓
❓
❓
❓
❓
Zero Server Transmission
✅
❌
❌
❌
❌
❌
Open Source Security
✅
❌
❌
❌
❌
❌
✅ = Implemented, ❌ = Not implemented, ❓ = Unclear/Unverified
🎯 Conclusion
Raze.bot implements a security-first architecture that ensures:
Private keys remain local - Never transmitted or stored on servers
Local transaction signing - All cryptographic operations performed in the browser
Encrypted storage - Wallet data protected at rest
Transparent security - Open-source code allows for public audit
Compared to competitors, Raze.bot offers the most secure approach to private key management by keeping all sensitive operations local to the user's device. While some competitors offer additional features like MEV protection, Raze.bot's focus on fundamental security principles provides users with the highest level of asset protection.
Users can confidently use Raze.bot knowing that their private keys and sensitive data remain under their complete control on their local device.
📞 Security Contact
For security-related questions or to report vulnerabilities:
GitHub Issues: Prefix with
[SECURITY]Support Center: https://help.fury.bot/
This security audit documentation demonstrates Raze.bot's commitment to user security and transparency. The platform's architecture ensures that users maintain complete control over their private keys while providing a seamless trading experience.
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